• China's long-running political system lasted from about 200 B.C. until the beginning of the twentieth century.
• However, elements of that political system have lasted even into the present day.
  
  
• Four major elements enabled the Confucian system to last so long:
  • Emperor: absolute leader whose word was law
  • Confucian Mandarins: a cadre of officials chosen by a rigid examination system based on Confucian classics; enforced allegiance and advised the Emperor
  • Civil service system: the first meritocratic system in the world; entrance required passing examinations that tested knowledge in Confucian classics
  • Military: supported the regime; protected Chinese from marauding nomads

• The Confucian system claimed to be a total, all-encompassing doctrine. Thus, the system did not merely seek the obedience of its citizens through the civil power, it also claimed to lay down the principles of social and family life.
• Confucius was the first philosopher to espouse the belief that the basis of a strong, stable state was a stable family system.
• This state system claimed to have the right to dictate not only how the state should be run, but how families should be run, and how the whole society and state should fit together.

• It was only under the impact of the West, in the nineteenth century, that this system began to fall apart.
  
• Following the humiliating defeat of China by the Japanese in the war of 1894 -1895, reformers began seeking alternatives to China's ancient system of government.
• While the Chinese conservatives said, "We cannot abandon the system of our ancestors," the Chinese reformers stated, "What use is the system of our ancestors, if we cannot protect the land of our ancestors?"

• After the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and the flight of the imperial court from Beijing, the Dowager Empress (Tzu Hsi) gave way to reforms, leading to the abandonment of the Confucian system.
• Confucianism was abolished as the basis for the civil-service exam system, thus ending the mandarinage system.
• Following the death of the Dowager Empress, the generals engineered the end of the imperial state, leaving the military as the sole power in the state.
• In 1949, although China was reunited as a strong government, elements of the ancient Confucian system could not be totally discarded.

                 

• Like Confucianism, the Communists had a totalist doctrine, not only claiming to understand the past, predict the future and order the lives of its citizens, but also claiming to know how citizens should regulate their private lives.
• Through their use of modern means of communication and organization, the Communist government was the first government in Chinese history which made itself felt through the entire land.

                

• The crucial difference between the communist system and the imperial system was that the Confucian system was a status quo system, looking back to a mythical golden age, while the essence of the communist system was change and movement.
• The Communists were different from their predecessors: they had decided that they were going to found a new civilization, based on Marxism and Leninism.
• At the very beginning of the new Chinese communist state, society was pummeled into new forms of ownership of land, property, industry and commerce. Initially, it seemed that this system worked brilliantly.

                

• Mao was impatient. He wanted China to overtake the Soviet Union and the United States in a few years.
• In the late 1950s, Mao implemented the"Great Leap Forward," leading to the disastrous famine of the early 1960s when 30 to 40 million people died.
• This famine shook the faith of many of Mao's colleagues in the socialist system.
• In order to "stiffen the backs" of his doubting colleagues, Mao launched the second massive disaster of the Chinese communist period, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."
• In an attempt to make his party more revolutionary and foster ideas of continual socialization of production, Mao unleashed the Red Guards, encouraging them to humiliate, denounce and even kill the "high and mighty" of the land.

• Following the death of Mao, Deng Xiaoping realized that China could not continue in this manner, and radically reformed Chinese policy.
• Thus, due to Deng Xiaoping's reforms, the Communist Party ceased to appeal to Marxism and Leninism as a means to lead the people.
• In today's party, Jiang Zemin, who is the General Secretary, possesses less power than Deng and Mao did in the Chinese political system.

• Where is China today?
• Although we are impressed by the massive economic development unleashed by Deng Xiaoping, China and the Communist party are in a fragile state.
• Despite its economic progress, China is in a difficult economic situation.
• Most of China's industry which was created under the old Stalinist system, is a drag on the economy.
• Chinese banks are not solvent, due to non-performing loans to the state industries.

• In the 1980s and 1990s, China suffered from continuing massive official corruption, infuriating its citizens.
• Party members,, having suffered so badly during the Cultural Revolution, have used their power to enrich themselves.
• In the 1950s and 1960s, the motto of Chairman Mao was "Serve the people." The motto of the party of the 1980s and 1990s was "To get rich is glorious."

• If China is going to be a modern society, the country needs to "open up," and allow for more modern means of communication.
• However, this is a great problem for the regime, because it has to try to control what ideas enter the country without slowing development.
  
• Faith in the Communist Party no longer exists. In the absence of an overarching political doctrine, people look elsewhere for spiritual comfort.
• Today there is an enormous growth of Christianity, Taoism, local religions, and Falun Gong.
• The ability of the Communist Party has been so undermined that on April 25, 1999, 10,000 members of Falun Gong were able to surround the main headquarters of the Chinese government and surprise the Chinese security system.

• What are our principles when dealing with China?
• China is a proud nation, which, over the course of the last two centuries, has lost a lot of its self-confidence.
• The "Century of Humiliation," as the Communists call it, is still uppermost in many Chinese minds.
• This sense of grievance means that the Chinese government is committed to Chinese sovereignty and security. They do not want to allow foreign powers to impinge upon Chinese soil.
• This poses a problem, as the Chinese government wants foreign investment in China without sacrificing any Chinese sovereignty.

• China desires the respect of outsiders, particularly the respect of the United States.
• Because of the economic dynamism of China, it needs the United States more than the United States needs China. If denied the United States market, China's economy is in grave danger of collapse.
• On the one hand, this is a proud country; on the other hand, it is a country that is fragile domestically. The Communist Party has lost its authority, and the economy needs the investment of the outside world.

• What should the United States consider in dealing with China and its problems?
• Paraphrasing a comment of Chairman Mao, the United States "should learn to walk on two legs." Our policy toward China must be composed both of interests and values.
• Of course we will engage with China. But, at the same time, China must be made to understand that if it is to get the full respect of the outside world, there are ways of dealing with its own citizens which are going to be seen by the West in particular as a reason for giving China that respect.

• When dealing with the issue of values, the United States must be clear with the Chinese in matters of foreign policy.
• It is important that the United States treats the Chinese with respect, but not kowtow to China.
• Over the last 20 years there has been a tendency for people in academia and politics to kowtow to China.

• What kind of future would the United States like to see for China in 20 to 30 years?
• America has little power to transform China into a democracy or preserve the government as it is today. If China is to change, it will be because of the efforts of the Chinese people.
• Would one prefer to have a democratic China, or is it better to have the present, stable regime in power?

• Taiwan instituted a democratic system in the late 1980's, which although it has problems, shows that the Chinese people can run democratic institutions.
• The United States should deal with the present regime with respect, but without kowtowing, with the hope that the Chinese will come fully into the world community as a democratic system.

1) Could you tell us a little about the differences between urban and rural China, both culturally and economically? In a few years, describe what changes might come to rural China? What will it look like?

2) Do you share Gordon Chang's pessimistic expectations for the consequences of World Trade Organization membership on state run enterprises?

Between 1840 and 1890, China lost several wars to foreign powers, ceding land and granting indemnity payments after each. The country also suffered a vicious internal war, the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), in which 15 million to 20 million people lost their lives. Despite Chinese attempts to reform both their society and its government by integrating Western practices with Chinese tradition in the 1870s and 1880s, Western colonialist expansion continued to eat away at Chinese territorial sovereignty. By 1890, Chinese of all social strata began to fear that the country would be “carved up like a melon," and began to unite in opposition to (Western) foreigners and the “foreign” Qing government (who were of a different ethnic group, the Manchus).

More than just the latest in a series of millenarian rebellions, the Boxers must be seen as both an expression of and a catalyst for this increasing nationalism. Like many other rebellions in Chinese history, the Boxers United in Righteousness began in the late 1890s in Shandong as a religious group practicing martial exercises and secret rites, with membership drawn from the poorest section of local society, whose ranks had swelled with victims of local floods and droughts. But the Boxers channeled their energy into fury primarily against Westerners in China, and secondarily at the Qing government, rather than into the creation of a new utopian society (as had superficially similar rebellions such as the Taiping, or indeed Mao’s actions during the Cultural Revolution).

They began in the spring of 1899 by sporadically attacking local missionaries in the Shandong area, and by June of 1900 moved against the entire Western expatriate community in Beijing, which they besieged for two months before a newly enlarged Western expeditionary force defeated them in August 1900 (final defeat of all groups sympathetic to the Boxers came only in September 1901). The Qing government’s position was ambivalent throughout the rebellion, although it ended up siding with the Boxers, and suffered the consequences: the Qing were forced to pay an enormous indemnity to the foreign powers, and to surrender additional territory.

With the defeat of the Boxers, Chinese nationalism settled temporarily into non-violent channels, most notably that of political agitation from outside the country. Chinese nationalism returned to the forefront of political life during the late 1910s and 1920s.

The May 4th Movement refers narrowly to the outburst of political demonstrations that occurred on May 4th, 1919, in response to the humiliating provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (among them that Shandong should be transferred to Japanese control). Taken more broadly, the term covers the movement for political, cultural and social change that was set in motion by these demonstrations but grew out of trends within Chinese society and thought.

The demonstrations themselves were originally student-led, but set in motion a wave of sympathy demonstrations and strikes that spread beyond the student milieu to encompass everyone from workers to industrialists in cities across the country.

The broader cultural movement built on this sense of outrage over China’s weak international position, using it to bring to the fore questions about China’s identity, national values, and culture. These questions had been circulating in Chinese culture for forty years, but gained urgency and breadth of social support in the face of the Republican government’s (1911-1949) inability to respond to this latest onslaught from abroad.

The movement’s many contributors focused on a variety of areas, but all agreed on the importance of revitalizing and unifying China so that it could combat warlordism, exploitation in the land-owning system, and foreign imperialism. Most also combined respect for Western progress and technology with a hope that the substance of Chinese culture could be retained. Some groups worked on writing reform (a switch comparable to moving from Latin to the vernacular in Catholic liturgy), while others delved into Western technology, and radicals attacked the traditional Confucian mindset and the social structures that accompanied it.

The May 4th movement failed in many of its long-term aims, hindered by a lack of socioeconomic support for its most ambitious goals, and by constant political instability that worsened into civil and eventually foreign war. The movement was bitterly criticized during the Cultural Revolution for its adulation of Western ideas, but was subsequently rehabilitated as an example of Chinese nationalism and progressiveness.

The Great Leap Forward represents the outcome of an internal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) debate over the scope and pace of change in the agricultural sector in the face of several years of slowing growth, and, more broadly, over the role of the CCP in guiding China’s development. On one side were Mao and his supporters, who argued for direct mass mobilization by local party leaders, with less scope for involvement by the CCP’s expert economic planners. Ranged against them were Mao’s opponents, a more technocratic faction that included Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and others. They argued for increasing material incentives for production by allowing private plots, widening the array of consumer goods available to farmers, and supplying improved agricultural machinery and fertilizer.

Building on their belief in the need for “continuous revolution” to maintain purity within the CCP and revolutionary fervor among the people, Mao and his faction argued for and won the chance to implement their vision of enormous People’s Communes in the countryside, where everything from grain harvesting to daycare to iron smelting would be done as part of the local collective. The drive to collectivize began in early 1958, gathered steam in 1959, and then wound down towards the end of 1960, as problems with the chosen strategy began to surface. During the famine that resulted (1959-62), approximately 30 million people died of starvation or a combination of malnutrition and disease.

As early as 1958 criticism of Mao’s policies began to emerge, and after an internal leadership struggle in July 1959, in which for the first time criticism of the CCP’s path was interpreted as criticism of Mao, he stepped down as head of state. By late 1960, the fatal flaws in the strategy that underpinned the Great Leap Forward had been revealed, and Mao was forced to withdraw from the day-to-day leadership of the CCP. Thereafter, the more moderate economic policies – chief among them the reinstitution of small private plots for farmers alongside collective farms – implemented in 1961-64 were credited with gradually improving the situation in the countryside. Although interrupted by the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), similar policies would be implemented twenty years later, as the post-Mao economic reforms gathered steam in the early 1980s.

Like the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) stemmed originally from long-term disagreements within the CCP leadership over the pace of socioeconomic change, the preferred means for attacking corruption within the party, and the importance of the idea of continuous revolution, but the Cultural Revolution had earth shaking ramifications for all of Chinese society. The “Culture” in the title refers to a 1965-66 dispute which acted as a catalyst for the chaotic decade that followed, a debate over what kind of culture and art should be supported by the CCP in its drive to create a socialist state. As in the Great Leap Forward, the Maoist faction won out over the more moderate group that included Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping. In the Cultural Revolution, however, all three were publicly and humiliatingly purged from the CCP, and only Deng outlived Mao to regain control of the CCP in the late 1970s.

By mid-1966, the Maoist faction had won out, and had begun to whip up revolutionary fervor among students and the young, who were anointed the Red Guards, the new vanguard of the revolution. Two years of social chaos followed, during which the CCP lost and then gradually regained control over local Red Guard factions which had taken over local CCP organizations.

Mao began to reassert his power in 1967, and some within his clique worked to limit disorder by supporting a three-way alliance between local party members, less radical students, and the army. The year saw numerous bloody clashes between the army and local Red Guards, and it was not until the summer of 1968 that order was finally restored, as leaders within Mao’s clique began to realize – as they had not perhaps during the Great Leap Forward – that things had gone too far.

From late 1967 through 1969, an organized Campaign to Purify Class Ranks was implemented, focusing on CCP party members whose backgrounds were “suspect” (containing some link to the West, to “bourgeois thought,” or to the Nationalist Party defeated in 1949). Countless innocent people were “struggled against” because of their backgrounds, humiliated in public, and then sent for reeducation to work in remote locations in the countryside, while being “rehabilitated” through their study of Mao’s thought.

In 1970 and 1971, Mao began to retreat from the hard line ideology he and his allies in the army had propounded throughout the 1960s, and in September 1971 his second-in-command, Defense Minister Lin Biao, died in suspicious circumstances. Mao’s ideological shift, and his purge of Lin Biao despite the idolization Lin had received throughout the Cultural Revolution, caused most Chinese to lose their faith in the CCP and its ideology, though not necessarily to consider any kind of direct resistance.

The retreat from the idea of continuous revolution continued through the early 1970s, as Mao’s earlier opponents – among them Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai - were gradually rehabilitated and returned to government. The country began to open up to the outside world again, seeking foreign technology and expertise to improve its economy, and reestablishing direct contact with the United States in 1971. However, no major economic or political changes were made until after Mao’s death in October 1976.

Chairman Mao died in October 1976. Within weeks, his chosen successor, Hua Guafeng, had had the most famous and most radical members of Mao’s faction – often known in Chinese as the Gang of Four – arrested. Less than two years later, Hua himself was edged out of power by Deng Xiaoping, who ushered in a period of unprecedentedly successful economic reform.

Continuing the opening to the outside that Zhou Enlai, Deng, and others had fostered in the early 1970s, the new economic policies, gradually implemented beginning in 1978, focused on the so-called Four Modernizations (of industry, agriculture, science, and technology) together with ongoing emphasis on national defense and self reliance where possible. In the countryside, reforms in the early 1980s replaced the former collective system with a hybrid of collectives and greatly enlarged private plots, offering significant scope for personal initiative. Several years later similar reforms were introduced in urban areas.

Increases in corruption, however, kept pace with increases in economic opportunity (which often came first to the well-connected or those within the CCP), leading to increasing resentment among the population at large. A freer press began reporting on once-taboo topics including corruption, its revelations permitted as long as the CCP’s authority and political hegemony were not questioned. For even as the CCP permitted an increasing degree of economic freedom to China’s citizens, albeit still within a socialist framework, it maintained strict limits on freedom of expression. Protests demanding additional democratization and an end to corruption erupted in 1979, 1986, 1987, and 1989, but were met with increasingly violent suppression.